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1. Introduction	In	 modern	 economies,	 mass	 production	 generates	 industry	 and	 energy	catastrophes	as	undesirable	byproducts.	Due	to	natural	hazard	(the	hand	of	God),	some	disasters	 are	 unavoidable;	 however,	 most	 of	 the	 others	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 human	negligence	or	wrongdoing.	 For	 instance,	 on	April	 24,	 2013,	near	Dhaka,	Bangladesh,	 a	garment	factory	(the	Rana	Plaza)	collapsed	without	warning,	killing	more	than	a	thousand	workers	and	injuring	two	thousand.	Several	well-known	Western	trade	companies	used	this	 workspace	 as	 subcontractors.	 They	 expected	 benefits	 from	 delocalizing	 in	Bangladesh	through	potential	quadruple	dumping	i)	low	wages,	ii)	weak	payroll	taxes,	iii)	weak	corporate	taxes,	and	iv)	deficient	environmental	regulation.	Judicial	investigations	showed	that	these	firms’	negligible	investments	in	safety	had	triggered	this	disaster.		The	breakdown	of	the	Deepwater	Horizon	oil	rig	leased	by	British	Petroleum	(BP)	(April	20,	2010	in	the	Gulf	of	Mexico)	is	another	example.	Although	the	number	of	killed	and	injured	by	this	event	was	comparatively	small,	it	caused	extensive	pollution	of	U.S.	territorial	waters.	BP	had	tried	to	exploit	rich	pockets	of	oil	in	the	deepest	offshore	well	ever	dug	in	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	The	subsequent	legal	investigations	revealed	significant	deficiencies	in	securing	the	project.3	In	France,	a	salmonella	scandal	at	the	French	dairy	group	Lactalis	at	the	end	of	2017	affected	83	countries.	The	French	authorities	required	Lactalis	to	recall	almost	12	million	infected	boxes.	Nevertheless,	between	2015	and	2017	some	200	babies	 suffered	 from	the	 infection.	Since	Lactalis’s	 liability	appears	obvious,	both	the	victims’	parents	and	the	French	authorities	currently	are	working	to	bring	the	corporate	 to	 Justice.	 In	 these	 examples,	 huge	 underinvestment	 in	 safety	 caused	major	accidents	involving	the	firms	in	both	criminal	and	civil	liability.		Since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 industrial	 revolution	 has	 facilitated	 the	expansion	of	 tort	 law	to	compensate	harm	and	provide	reparations	to	third	parties.	 In	reviving	 the	 Law	 and	 Economic	 tradition,	 Ronald	 Coase	 (1960)	 and	 Guido	 Calabresi	(1961)	showed	that	effective	tort	law	leads	potential	injurers	to	invest	in	prevention	to	avoid	out	of	proportion	reparations	and	compensation.4	As	a	result,	due	to	their	capacity	and	 financial	 constraints,	 firm	managers	are	constantly	arbitraging	resources	between	production	and	prevention	activities.	Thus,	it	is	legitimate	to	question	whether	liability	
																																								 																				
3. See for instance the significant U.S. Government (2011) Report part II. 
4. See e.g. Micelli (1997), Cooter and Ulen (2003).  
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regimes	 affect	 competition,	 and	 whether	 the	 effects	 if	 any	 change	 according	 to	 the	specificities	of	the	liability	regime,	and	by	extension	whether	under	competition,	a	specific	liability	 regime	 is	 more	 efficient	 than	 another?	 The	 present	 article	 addresses	 these	questions.	We	depart	 from	the	basic	accident	model’s	assumptions	as	defined	by	Calabresi	(1970),	Brown	(1973)	and	especially	Shavell	 (1980,	1982	1987,	2004)	by	 introducing	competition	between	two	injurers	under	different	liability	regimes,	namely	strict	liability	and	negligence.	We	develop	a	constrained	Cournot-Nash	duopoly	model	for	a	perfectly	substitutable	good	with	production	inputs	and	prevention	levels	as	strategic	variables.	A	previously	rational	and	benevolent	regulator	enforces	a	given	liability	regime.5	We	follow	Pu-yan	Nie	and	You-hua	Chen	(2012)	who	consider	constrained	inputs	but	in	contrast	to	their	paper	the	firms	in	our	model	compete	under	asymmetric	capacity	constraints.	These	constraints	on	each	firm’s	strategy	set	imply	that	it	is	not	straightforward	to	establish	a	correspondence	between	 the	model	 solutions	 and	 the	 social	 first	 best	 of	 the	 standard	unilateral	 accident	 model	 in	 which	 a	 representative	 firm	 disposes	 of	 inexhaustible	resources	when	determining	its	optimal	level	of	prevention.	There	is	a	large	literature	that	compares	competitive	market	structures	using	the	accident	 model	 under	 the	 product	 liability	 motive,	 and	 which	 has	 been	 reviewed	 by	Daughety	and	Reinganum	(2013)	and	Geistfeld	(2009).	Pioneering	authors	compared	the	efficiency	of	different	market	structures	under	product	liability	(see	e.g.	Epple	and	Raviv,	1978).	 However,	 the	 interplay	 between	 industrial	 organization	 and	 legal	 liability	 has	received	much	less	attention	compared	to	work	on	the	interaction	between	liability	and	innovation	 or	 insurance	 (Viscusi	 and	 Moore,	 1991a,b,	 1993).	 The	 more	 recent	 work	(Baumann	and	Heine,	2012)	combines	competition,	innovation	and	liability	for	the	case	of	risky	products.	Our	approach	is	closer	to	Spulber	(1989)	which	shows	that	the	firm’s	production	level	can	influence	the	investment	costs	related	to	prevention.	For	example,	investing	 in	 prevention	 depends	 on	 the	 cross	 effect	 of	 these	 investments	 and	 the	monopoly’s	production	costs.	Thus,	potential	injurers	in	very	competitive	markets	may	offer	products	 that	are	 insufficiently	secure.	Boyd	(1994)	shows	that	 the	optimal	 legal	system	is	particularly	sensitive	to	market	structure	and	the	characteristics	of	the	firm’s	risk	 reduction	 technology	 which	 result	 applies	 also	 to	 financial	 responsibility	
																																								 																				
5 Each regime is defined later.  
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requirements.	 Our	 approach	 takes	 the	 opposite	 perspective.	 It	 shows	 that	 market	equilibria	depend	on	the	nature	of	the	enforced	liability	regimes.	The	 rest	of	 the	paper	 is	 organized	as	 follows.	 In	 section	2	we	 introduce	 the	model;	 in	section	 three,	 we	 study	 the	 equilibrium	 outcomes	 under	 different	 liability	 regimes	enforced	by	the	regulator,	and	we	compare	their	efficiency.	Section	4	concludes	the	paper.		2. The	Model	Consider	an	industry	composed	of	two	firms	whose	activities	are	is	hazardous	and	may	generate	harm	to	human	health	and	the	environment.	A	rational	regulator	enforces	a	given	civil	liability	regime	in	the	form	either	of	a	strict	liability	or	of	a	negligence	rule;	we	define	these	regimes	here,	and	describe	them	in	detail	in	section	three.	2.1 The	producers’	production	set	and	the	accident	costs		Each	 firm	 indexed	 𝑖 = 1,2	 produces	 output	 𝑞l.	 The	 production	 function	 𝜑(𝑦l),	𝜑: 0, 𝑌l 	→ ℝr,	is	assumed	to	be	linear	with	identical	marginal	products	𝑎 > 1:		 𝑞l = 𝜑 𝑦l = 𝑎𝑦l.	 (1)	A	major	accident	may	affect	 the	 firm’s	activity	 in	which	case	 it	 induces	damage	proportional	to	production	(see	e.g.	Dari-Mattiacci	and	De	Geest,	2005).	Damage	per	unit	of	output	is	𝐷;	it	is	sufficiently	large	that	𝑎 > 1 + 1/𝐷.	Total	damage	for	firm	𝑖	is:		 𝑑l = 𝐷𝑞l	 (2)	The	probability	of	an	accident	is		𝑝 𝑥l 	in	firm	𝑖	(with	1 − 𝑝 𝑥l 	the	probability	of	no-accident).	Probability	𝑝 𝑥l 	depends	on	the	level	of	care	𝑥l	chosen	by	the	firm.	This	is	decreasing	and	convex	in	𝑥l,	or	𝑝′ 𝑥l < 0	and	𝑝′′ 𝑥l ≥ 0.	Also,	we	assume	𝑝 0 ≡ 1	and	𝑝 𝑌l ≡ 0.	 Therefore,	 the	 expected	 cost	 of	 an	 accident	 𝐸𝐶(𝑥l)	 is	 0 ∙ 1 − 𝑝 𝑥l + 𝑑l 	 ∙𝑝 𝑥l = 𝑝 𝑥l 𝐷𝜑 𝑦l = 𝑝 𝑥l 𝐷𝑞l.	Firms	compete	with	production	input	𝑦l	and	prevention	𝑥l	as	strategic	variables	under	asymmetric	capacity	constraints	𝑌 ≠ 𝑌:		 𝑦l + 𝑥l ≤ 𝑌l,	𝑖 = 1,2.	 (3)	Considering	 the	expression	of	prices	𝜋(. ) =	 ,	 for	simplicity	we	assume	an	affine	inverse	demand	function:	𝜋(𝜑 𝑦 + 𝜑 𝑦 ) = 𝐾 − (𝜑 𝑦 + 𝜑 𝑦 ) = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦 + 𝑦).		
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The	 following	 inequalities	 ensure	 a	 non-negative	 market	 price	 and	 prevention	levels	between	0	and	1,	0 ≤ 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑌 + 𝑌) < 𝐷,	and		𝑌l < 1 + 1/𝑎𝐷.		Firm	 𝑖’s	 profit	 function	will	 depend	 on	 its	 involvement	 in	 the	 liability	 regime	 and	 the	nature	of	that	regime.	Payoff	𝐵l 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 : 0, 𝑌l  → ℝr	is	stochastic:		 𝐵l 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 = 𝜑 𝑦l 𝜋 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦 − 𝑥l − 𝑦l − 𝑑l.	 (4)	It	is	such	that:	
	 𝐵l 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 = 𝜑 𝑦l 𝜋 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦 − 𝑥l − 𝑦l − 𝐷𝜑 𝑦l 		(accident)𝜑 𝑦l 𝜋 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦 − 𝑥l − 𝑦l																		(no	accident).	 (5)	Therefore,	the	expected	profit	is:		 𝔼𝐵l 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 = 𝜑 𝑦l 𝜋 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦 − 𝑥l − 𝑦l − 𝑝 𝑥l 𝐷𝜑 𝑦l .	 (6)	Firm	 𝑖	maximizes	 the	expected	profit	under	 the	constraint	 (3)	 for	non-negative	inputs:		 Max, 𝔼𝐵l 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 ,	 (7)		 s.t.	 𝑦l + 𝑥l ≤ 	𝑌l.	 (7a)	Without	established	tort	 law,	firms	do	not	forecast	any	care	for	repair	purposes	(𝑥l ≡ 0),	and	the	model	corresponds	to	a	standard	duopoly	with	a	capacity	constrained	input	as	the	strategic	variable:		 Max, 𝜑 𝑦l 𝜋 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦 − 𝑦l,	 (8)	s.t.	 𝑦l ≤ 	𝑌l	 (8a)		 2.2 Decision	tree	Competition	between	potential	injurers	is	modelled	as	a	Cournot-Nash	game	with	production	 inputs	 and	prevention	 levels	 as	 the	 strategic	 variables.	 The	 game	 includes	several	stages:	Stage-1:	The	regulator	enforces	a	specific	civil	liability	rule	on	all	firms.	Stage-2:	Each	firm	maximizes	its	profits	by	choosing	the	optimal	levels	of	prevention	and	production	input,	and	therefore,	of	output	given	the	other	firm’s	quantity	and	constraint	on	its	available	resources.	
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Stage-3:	Given	the	liability	regime,	firms	compare	their	equilibrium	care	level	to	the	social	level.	 Depending	 on	 the	 regime,	 they	 decide	 whether	 to	 reduce	 their	 equilibrium	production	level	to	comply	with	the	social	norm.	Stage-4:	Nature	comes	into	play,	and	a	harm	may	occur.	Stage-4(a):	No	accident	occurs,	firms	receive	their	pay-offs	and	the	game	stops.	Stage-4(b):	An	accident	occurs	and	causes	damage.	Stage-5:	After	Stage-4(b),	the	court	makes	its	decision:	Stage-5(a):	Under	strict	 liability,	 the	court	 looks	 for	the	existence	of	a	causal	 link	between	the	firm’s	activity	and	the	damage.	If	this	link	is	positive,	the	judge	determines	the	repair	value	which	is	assumed	to	be	equal	to	the	value	of	damage,	and	sentences	the	injurer	to	repair.	Stage-5(b):	Under	negligence,	the	court	gauges	the	adequacy	of	the	measures	taken	by	the	injurer	relative	to	the	social	care	level.6	If	the	injurer	has	complied	with	that	level	then	it	escapes	liability,	otherwise	the	judge	will	conclude	that	the	injurer	is	liable,	and	must	make	reparations.	3. Equilibrium	and	Liability	Regimes	A	Cournot-Nash	equilibrium	is	reached	under	the	burden	of	a	given	legal	regime	as	mentioned	 in	 the	 decision	 tree.	 To	 simplify	 the	 explanation,	we	 begin	with	 a	 strict	liability	regime	which	is	used	throughout	the	paper	as	the	benchmark.	Furthermore,	note	that,	as	the	resource	is	limited,	we	cannot	not	expect	compliance	between	the	SCL	and	the	optimal	level	of	care	that	the	firms	choose	(Shavell	(1986),	Beard	(1990)).			 3.1 Equilibrium	and	strict	liability.		Strict	 liability	 consists	 of	 a	 burdening	 liability	 imposed	 on	 a	 party	 without	identifying	a	fault.	It	is	the	opposite	of	negligence	or	tortious	intent.	The	plaintiff	needs	only	prove	that	the	misdeed	arose	and	that	the	injurer	was	liable.	The	regulator	enforces	strict	liability	for	activities	it	considers	to	be	innately	hazardous.	This	should	discourage	
																																								 																				
6 However, note that the court may find it difficult to assess the adequacy of the level of prevention given the 
level of activity (Shavell, 1987; Shavell and Polinsky, 2005). 
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careless	behavior	and	useless	loss	by	inducing	potential	perpetrators	to	take	all	possible	care.	It	also	simplifies	court	decisions	by	lowering	the	necessity	to	find	evidence.	Firms	make	their	production	and	investment	decisions	simultaneously,	and	each	knows	the	cost	structure	and	the	payoff	function	of	its	opponent.	So,	the	game	is	one	of	complete	but	imperfect	information,	and	competition	is	static	(Tirole,	1988).	To	simplify	the	whole	calculus,	we	use	a	linear	probability	of	accident	𝑝 𝑥l = 1 − 𝑥l	as	in	Hiriart	and	Martimort	 (2006),	with	 0 ≤ 𝑥l < 1.	 This	 assumption	 affects	 the	minimum	 value	 of	 	𝑌l	which	must	be	greater	than	or	equal	to	1.	Under	strict	liability	the	program	of	firms	𝑖 =1,2	are:		 max	, 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦 + 𝑦) 𝑎	𝑦l − 𝑥l − 	𝑦l − 1 − 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎	𝑦l	 (9)	s.t.	 𝑦l + 𝑥l ≤ 	𝑌l.	 (9a)		 1 − 𝑥l ≥ 0.	 (9b)	Lemma	1:	Under	strict	liability,	the	best	responses	for	production	input	𝑦l	and	care	𝑥l	of	firm	 𝑖	 depend	 only	 on	 𝑦	 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2 ,	 and	 are	 such	 that	 𝑦l	 and	 𝑦	 are	 strategic	substitutes	whereas	𝑥l	and	𝑦	are	strategic	complements:	Proof	of	Lemma	1:	The	proof	is	given	in	appendix	A.	We	obtain:		 𝑦l =  + (r)(r) 	and	𝑥l =  + ((r))(r) ,	𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.	█	From	Lemma	1,	if	firm	𝑗	exerts	more	market	power	by	lowering	its	output,	firm	𝑖	maintains	the	price	low	by	increasing	its	production	input	(𝜕𝑦l/𝜕𝑦 = −𝑎/2(𝑎 + 𝐷))	at	the	expense	of	safety:	care	decreases	by	the	same	amount	(	𝜕𝑥l/𝜕𝑦 = 𝑎/2 𝑎 + 𝐷 );	thus,	the	 effect	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 accident	 in	 firm	 𝑖	 is	 𝜕𝑝 𝑥l /𝜕𝑦 = −𝑎/2(𝑎 + 𝐷).	 This	result	which	would	occur	e.g.	if	firm	𝑗	were	more	constrained	(e.g.,	𝑌	changes	to	𝑌 < 𝑌),	shows	the	trade-off	between	market	power	and	safety	under	strict	liability.	The	Cournot-Nash	solutions	for	production	inputs	(𝑦, 𝑦)	and	equilibrium	care	levels	are:		 𝑦 = (r(	))r(r(		))(r)(r) ,		 (10)		 𝑦 = (r())r(r())(r)(r) .	 (11)		 	𝑥l = (r r)	r	(r)(r) + ()(r) for	𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗	 	 (12)	The	 Cournot-Nash	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 game	 is	 given	 by	 𝑞, 𝑞, 𝑥, 𝑥 	where	𝑞l = 𝑎𝑦l, 𝑖 = 1,2	and	the	market	price:	
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	 𝜋 ≡ 𝜋 𝜑 𝑦 + 𝜑 𝑦 = 𝐾 − 𝑎 𝑦 + 𝑦 =  r rr  	rr ,	 (13)	3.2 Negligence	rule	An	agent	that	fails	to	exercise	due	care,	ethical	rules,	etc.	commits	negligence	if	this	failure	involves	harm	to	one	or	several	persons.	An	individual	that	suffers	damage	caused	by	another’s	carelessness	may	be	able	 to	 litigate	 in	court	 to	compensate	 for	his	or	her	losses	 (these	 losses	 include	 injury,	 physical	 or	moral,	 harm	 to	property	 and	economic	activities).	However,	if	the	potential	injurer	can	provide	evidence	that	it	fulfilled	its	due	care	then	it	will	escape	any	involvement	in	liability.	Thus,	the	negligence	rule	requires	a	social	 standard	of	due	care	 to	be	defined.	Let	us	define	 its	value	before	 turning	 to	 the	market	equilibrium	conditions.	3.2.1 The	social	cost	of	an	accident	and	the	socially	first-best	care	level	The	standard	unilateral	accident	model	proposes	an	endogenous	determination	of	the	 socially	 optimal	 care	 level	 that	 results	 from	 maximization	 of	 the	 profit	 of	 a	representative	firm	(a	monopoly).	This	profit	is		 𝐵 𝑥 ≡ 𝐺 − 𝑥 − ℎ 𝑥 ,	 (14)	where	𝐺	is	the	firm’s	constant	global	payoff;	ℎ 𝑥 	is	the	direct	cost	of	an	accident.	Since	𝐺	is	 constant,	 the	 program	 amounts	 to	 minimizing	 total	 cost	 𝑥 + ℎ 𝑥 .	 The	 level	 of	prevention	𝑥 > 0	that	minimizes	the	company’s	total	cost	is	such	that:		 ℎ 𝑥 = −1.	 (15)	In	this	approach,	𝑥	is	also	the	socially	optimal	level	of	prevention	that	minimizes	the	expected	social	cost	of	an	accident	𝐸𝑆𝐶 𝑥 	which	reduces	to	𝐸𝑆𝐶 𝑥 = 𝑥 + ℎ 𝑥 .	The	firm	 bears	 the	 costs	 of	 accident.	 Although	 important,	 this	 result	 relies	 on	 numerous	restrictive	assumptions:	fixed	gains,	lack	of	competition,	unlimited	resources.		In	our	model,	we	can	determine	this	level	by	considering	a	benevolent	regulator	that	imposes	a	first	best	social	level	of	care.	We	share	the	view	that	the	regulator	calculates	an	a	priori	value	for	that	level	which	firms	should	adopt.	In	the	case	of	an	accident,	under	negligence,	the	judges	agree	on	that	level	and	verify	the	adequacy	of	the	injurer’s	care.	As	under	 the	 unilateral	 standard	 accident	 model,	 the	 regulator	 seeks	 to	 minimize	 the	expected	social	cost	of	an	accident	comprised	of	the	prevention	cost	𝑥	and	the	expected	cost	of	an	accident	𝑝 𝑥 𝐻(𝑥),	where	𝐻(𝑥)	is	the	total	damage	which	here	depends	on	the	level	of	care.	Replacing	𝑦l	with	𝑌l − 𝑥l,	the	expected	social	cost	becomes:	
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	 𝐸𝑆𝐶 𝑥 = 𝑥l + 𝑝 𝑥l 𝐻 𝑥l = 𝑥l + 1 − 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎	(𝑌l − 𝑥l), 𝑖 = 1,2.	 (16)	From	the	first	order	conditions,	the	socially	optimal	care	level	(SOCL)	is			 𝑥l = 	 +  − .	 (17)	In	appendix	B,	we	show	that	the	internal	solution	concerning	the	level	of	care	determined	under	strict	liability	does	not	fit	with	the	socially	first	best	level	of	care,	i.e.	𝑥l > 𝑥l.	This	result	means	that	competition	leads	the	firms	never	to	conform	to	the	SOCL.	Then,	the	regulator	knows	that	under	a	negligence	rule,	firms	must	increase	their	level	of	care	to	comply	with	the	SOCL.	It	follows	that	the	regulator	exogenously	may	set	a	level	of	care	lower	than	that	level.	There	may	be	several	reasons	for	this	i.e.	encouraging	strategic	or	vital	production,	or	avoiding	to	much	involvement	in	civil	reparations	if	the	courts	have	previously	agreed	on	an	unattainable	𝑥l.	In	 what	 follows,	 the	 regulator	 chooses	 a	 minimum	 accident	probability	𝑝	as	the	standard	of	care	.	To	comply	with	this	firms	should	choose	a	level	of	care	𝑥∗, 𝑥∗ ≤ 𝑥	such	that	 lim→∗𝑝( 𝑥) = 𝑝.	We	call	𝑥∗,		the	Social	Care	Level	(SCL).	This	is	a	similar	situation	described	by	Kolstad,	Ulen	and	Johnson	(1990)	where	the	optimum	level	of	an	ex	ante	safety	regulation	should	be	less	than	the	socially	optimal	level	of	precaution.	Furthermore,	we	assume	that	the	court	knows	the	firms’	cost	structures	and	will	refer	to	this	level	to	assess	the	injurer’s	liabilities	(i.e.	there	are	no	divergence	between	the	judge	and	the	regulator	(Posner,	(2003)).		3.2.2 Negligence	rule	and	the	market	equilibrium	We	consider	as	 the	baseline	 the	previous	equilibrium	achieved	under	 the	 strict	liability	 regime	 𝑞, 𝑞, 𝑥, 𝑥	 .	We	distinguish	 three	cases	according	 to	whether	 the	social	norm	𝑥∗	is	lower	or	greater	than	𝑥l,	𝑖 = 1,2.	Case	1:	𝑥l < 𝑥∗	∀	𝑖 = 1,2.	The	equilibrium	levels	of	care	that	firms	should	chose	under	 strict	 liability	 are	 less	 than	 the	 level	 the	 regulator	 requires	 under	 negligence.	However,	 under	 negligence	 firms	 are	 supposed	 to	 avoid	 any	 liability;	 thus,	 they	must	increase	safety	by	supplying	a	sufficient	care	level	(at	least	𝑥∗),	and	consequently	using	fewer	production	inputs.	The	firms’	payoff	structure	is	denoted	𝐵:		 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦l + 𝑦) 𝑎	𝑦l − 𝑥l − 	𝑦l − 𝑝 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎	𝑦l		if	𝑥l < 𝑥∗	𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦l + 𝑦) 𝑎	𝑦l − 𝑥l − 	𝑦l																												if	𝑥l ≥ 𝑥∗ ,𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗	 (18)	
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Payoff	structure	(18)	resembles	the	standard	negligence	approach	in	economics.	However,	 introducing	 strategic	 competition	 entails	 several	 changes,	 notably	 that	 the	results	are	not	 in	 line	with	the	regulator’s	expectations,	and	a	prisoner’s	dilemma	may	exist.	Indeed,	when	both	firms	comply	with	the	SCL	and	produce	respectively	𝑞∗	and	𝑞∗,	then	the	total	output	𝑞∗ + 𝑞∗	is	lower	than	the	output	under	strict	liability:		 𝑞l − 𝑞l∗ = 𝑎 𝑦l − 𝑦l∗ > 0l§l§ 	 (19)	However,	a	firm,	for	instance	𝑖,	may	exploit	the	decrease	in	total	output	strategically	by	raising	 its	 own	 supply	within	 the	 interval	 [𝑞l, 𝑞l + (𝑞 − 𝑞∗)]	 to	 increase	 its	market	power.	Consequently,	firm	𝑖’s	expected	payoff	may	increase.	Then,	firm	𝑖,	which	observes	the	SCL,	may	define	its	highest	profits	in	𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦∗ .	Therefore,	firm	𝑖	will	enhance	its	output	by	increasing	its	use	of	production	inputs	from	𝑦l∗	to	some		𝑦lª > 𝑦l∗,	and	thus	by	decreasing	its	care	level	to		𝑥lª < 𝑥l∗.	More	formally,	 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª 	is	such	that:	𝑥lª, 𝑦lª ∈ argmax¬,¬ 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦∗ 	Consequently,	 if	 𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦∗ 	 is	 greater	 than	 𝐵 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦l∗ +𝑦∗) 𝑎𝑦l∗ − 𝑥l∗ − 𝑦l∗,	 the	payoff	when	both	firms	comply	with	the	SCL,	then	it	 is	not	 in	𝑖’s	interest	 to	 conform	 to	 𝑥l∗.	 This	 is	 a	 prisoner’s	 dilemma	 which	 arises	 partly	 from	 the	assumption	of	risk	neutral	firms.	It	is	summarized	in	Table	1.		Table	1:	The	potential	prisoner’s	dilemma					Firm	𝑖	
Firm	𝑗		 𝐶	 𝐶		 𝐶	 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ 	 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗; 𝑦l∗ 	𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦ª 		 𝐵ª 𝑥ª, 𝑦ª; 𝑦l∗ 		 𝐶	 𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦∗ 	 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗; 𝑦lª 	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª, 𝑦ª 	 𝐵 𝑥ª, 𝑦ª; 𝑦lª 		In	Table	1,	𝐶	is	“complies	with	the	SCL”,	and	𝐶	is	“does	not	comply”.	E.g.,	in	the	bottom	right	cell	𝐶𝐶	none	of	the	firms	complies.	There	are	four	cases:	i) 𝐶𝐶:	both	firms	comply,	and	thus	are	free	from	any	liability.	Their	payoffs	are	given	above,	𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦l∗ + 𝑦∗) 𝑎𝑦l∗ − 𝑥l∗ − 𝑦l∗,	𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.		
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ii) 𝐶𝐶	or	𝐶𝐶:	firm	𝑖	(resp.	𝑗)	does	not	comply	and	may	extend	its	supply,	given	that	firm	𝑗	(resp.	𝑖)	complies.	We	discuss	the	potential	payoffs	below.	iii) 𝐶𝐶:	 none	 of	 the	 firms	 complies.	 The	 equilibrium	 payoff	 is	 denoted	 by	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦ª 	which	 is	 less	 than	𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ 	 and	 different	 from	 the	 payoff	under	strict	liability	𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 .		Proposition	 1.	 Under	 negligence,	 when	 𝑥l < 𝑥∗	(𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗),	 two	 situations	 may	arise:	a) If	 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 < 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ 	 and	 𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦∗ < 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ ,		 where	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦∗ = Sup,{𝐵° 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦∗ }	then:	i. The	market	equilibrium	is	(𝑞l∗, 𝑞∗), (𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗	ii. The	equilibrium	price	is,	𝜋∗,	𝜋∗ > 𝜋.		b) If	 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 < 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ 	 and	 𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦∗ > 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ ,	 where	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦∗ = Sup{𝐵° 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦∗ };	then,	there	is	a	prisoner	dilemma:	i. The	market	 equilibrium	 is	 𝑞lª, 𝑞ª 		with	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦ª < 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ 	and	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª; 𝑦ª < 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 .	ii. The	correspondent	price	𝜋ª, 𝜋ª < 𝜋∗	may	be	higher	or	lower	than	𝜋.	Proof	of	proposition	1:	See	appendix	C	 █	Part	a	of	proposition	1	shows	that	firms	derive	no	advantage	from	deviating	from	the	SCL.	Consequently,	there	is	no	prisoner’s	dilemma.	The	negligence	enforcement	leads	to	a	different	equilibrium	from	that	under	strict	liability.	Moreover,	the	risk	level	is	lower	than	under	an	objective	liability	regime,	and	the	quantity	also	is	lower	because	the	price	is	higher.	Part	b	of	the	proposition	shows	when	a	prisoner	dilemma	exists.	Both	agents	are	led	to	take	the	risk	because	they	both	ignore	the	fact	that	the	other	will	deviate	as	in	a	classic	prisoner’s	dilemma	(information	is	imperfect	and	complete).	The	equilibrium	is	the	worst	possible:	the	risk	is	higher	than	under	negligence	and	outputs	do	not	maximize	the	firms’	payoffs.	Were	the	regulator	to	implement	negligence,	it	would	place	the	firms	in	a	prisoner’s	dilemma	with	a	higher	risk	of	accident	than	under	strict	liability.		Case	2:	𝑥l > 𝑥∗, 𝑖 = 1,2.	Here,	the	equilibrium	 𝑞, 𝑞, 𝑞, 𝑥	 	is	such	that	𝑥l >𝑥∗ ⇒ 𝑦l < 𝑦l∗, 𝑖 = 1,2,	and	the	expected	payoffs	that	correspond	to	negligence	are	
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	 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦	 = 𝐾 − 𝑎 𝑦l + 𝑦 𝑎	𝑦l − 𝑥l − 	𝑦l − 𝑝 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎	𝑦l	if	𝑥l < 𝑥l∗	𝐾 − 𝑎 𝑦l + 𝑦 𝑎	𝑦l − 𝑥l − 	𝑦l																												if	𝑥l ≥ 𝑥l∗ , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.	(20)	We	 therefore	have	𝜑 𝑦l < 𝜑 𝑦l∗ , 𝑖 = 1,2,	 and	 thus	𝜑 𝑦 + 𝜑 𝑦 < 𝜑 𝑦∗ + 𝜑 𝑦∗ ,	which	implies	𝜋∗ < 𝜋.	The	arguments	are	stated	in	the	following	proposition.	Proposition	2.	Under	negligence,	when	𝑥l > 𝑥∗	(	𝑖 = 1,2),	the	market	equilibrium	price	is	lower	than	the	price	corresponding	to	the	SCL:	𝜋∗ < 𝜋.	Proof	of	proposition	2:	the	proof	uses	similar	arguments	to	those	stated	in	the	proof	of	proposition	1.a.ii	and	1.b.ii.		 █	Under	both	strict	liability	and	negligence,	case	2	is	such	that	firms	overinvest	in	safety	without	any	possibility	to	adjust	care	levels	to	the	social	value.	Let	us	compare	these	regimes,	 assuming	 first	 that	 firms	 meet	 similar	 conditions	 under	 both	 regimes	 i.e.,	𝑞, 𝑞 	are	identical.	Without	further	demonstration,	we	can	easily	form	the	following	proposition	which	establishes	the	convergence	between	both	regimes.	Proposition	3.	Under	the	conditions	given	in	proposition	2,	negligence	and	strict	liability	converge	to	the	same	equilibrium	values.	Proof	of	proposition	3:	the	proof	uses	arguments	similar	to	those	set	out	above.	Note	that	under	negligence,	neither	firm	1	nor	firm	2	has	an	interest	in	increasing	its	production	level	by	decreasing	its	safety	level	to	𝑥l∗	because	this	would	increase	the	price,	and	thus	would	 contradict	 the	 Nash	 equilibrium	 of	 the	 game.	 Indeed,	 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l, 𝑦 ≥𝐵 𝑥l³, 𝑦l³, 𝑦³	 ,	∀	𝑖 = 1,2,	 , 𝑘 ≠ 𝑀.	This	 last	 expression	means	 that	 all	 other	 values	 than	𝑥l, 𝑦l ,	 including	 the	 values	 drawn	 from	 the	 application	 of	 the	 SCL,	 lead	 to	 lower	payoffs.	 █	Case	 3:	 𝑥l > 𝑥l∗	 and	 𝑥 < 𝑥∗,		𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.	 Firm	 𝑖	 complies	 with	 the	 SCL	whereas	 firm	 𝑗	 does	 not;	 we	 must	 have	 𝑦l < 𝑦l∗	 and	 𝑦 > 𝑦∗.	 This	 case	 is	 a	 direct	consequence	of	𝑌l ≠ 𝑌.	Recall	that	under	strict	liability	𝑞l = 𝑎𝑦l		and	𝑞l < 𝑞l∗,	∀	𝑖 = 1,2.	Under	negligence	however,		𝑥 < 𝑥∗	means	that	𝑞 > 𝑞∗,	and	𝑗’s	payoff	corresponds	to	the	following	situation:		
𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦;𝑦l = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦 + 𝑦l) 𝑎	𝑦 − 𝑥 − 	𝑦 	− 𝑝 𝑥 𝐷𝑎	𝑦		𝑖𝑓	𝑥 < 𝑥∗	𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦 + 𝑦l) 𝑎	𝑦 − 𝑥 − 	𝑦																											𝑖𝑓	𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗	 	 (21)	
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a)	If	it	turns	out	that	𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑦l < 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗; 𝑦l∗ ,	firm	j	chooses	𝑥∗	to	avoid	any	liability.	This	 change	exerts	an	 influence	on	 firm	 𝑖’s	action.	Because	now,	 its	opponent	chooses	to	supply	𝜑 𝑦∗ 	rather	than	𝜑 𝑦 ,	where	𝜑 𝑦∗ < 𝜑 𝑦 .	Firm	𝑖	may	see	its	probability	 of	 accident	 increase	 (following	 lemma	 1)	 because	 as	 firm	 𝑗	 decreases	 it	production	from	𝜑 𝑦 	to	𝜑 𝑦∗ 	firm	𝑖	may	find	it	profitable	to	increase	production.	This	production	increase	𝜑 𝑦l 	lies	in	the	interval	 	𝜑 𝑦∗ , 𝜑 𝑦 	 	for	𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦∗	 ≥ 0	with	𝑝 𝑥l ≤ 𝑝 𝑥∗ .	The	 total	quantity	supplied	at	equilibrium	 is	𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦∗ 	and	the	equilibrium	price	𝜋 = 𝐾 − 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦∗ = 1 − 𝑎(𝑦l + 𝑦∗).	Here,	 𝑥l, 𝑦l 	are	 the	 new	Nash-equilibrium	 values	 associated	 to	 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗ .	 It	 then	 is	 obvious	 that	 as	𝑎 𝑦l + 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝑎 𝑦l∗ + 𝑦∗ 	 then	 𝜋 ≥ 𝜋	 because	 increasing	 care	 involves	 decreasing	production	input	and	therefore	quantity;	this	may	increase	scarcity	and	lead	to	a	rise	in	the	equilibrium	selling	price.		b)	 Conversely,	 if	 𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑦l > 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗; 𝑦l∗ ,	 then	 𝑗	 may	 consider	 that	 the	probability	of	an	accident	is	sufficiently	low	that	it	is	in	its	interest	is	to	choose	 𝑥, 𝑦 .	This	latter	combination	insures	a	higher	production	level	as	well	as	𝑞l > 𝑞l∗	with	𝑥l <𝑥l∗.	The	equilibrium	price	is	the	same	as	the	price	under	strict	liability,	that	is	𝑃.	Proposition	4.	If	𝑥l > 𝑥l∗	whereas	𝑥 < 𝑥∗,	𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,	then	firm	𝑖	complies	with	the	SCL	 because	 𝑥l > 𝑥l∗ ⇒ 𝑦l < 𝑦l∗.	 Firm	 j,	 however	 faces	 two	 situations	 according	 to	whether	𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑦l < 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗; 𝑦l∗ 	or	𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦; 𝑦l > 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗; 𝑦l∗ .	a) When	𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑦l < 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗, 𝑦l∗ ,	 it	 is	 in	firm	j’s	 interest	is	to	comply	with	the	SCL	and	to	choose	inputs	equal	to	 𝑥, 𝑦 	such	that	𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗	Consequently,	the	equilibrium	will	be	 𝑞l, 𝑞 with	for	each	firm,	𝑥l ≥ 𝑥l∗, i = 1,2	and	as	𝑦l <𝑦l,	𝑖 = 1,2,	then	 𝑞l, 𝑞 < 𝑞l, 𝑞 	and	for	an	equilibrium	price,	𝜋	such	that	𝜋 = 𝐾 − 𝜑 𝑦l + 𝜑 𝑦 = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦𝑀l + 𝑦),	with	𝜋∗ ≥ 𝜋 > 𝜋.	b) When	𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑦l > 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗, 𝑦l∗ ,	it	is	in	firm	j’s	interest	not	to	comply	with	the	social	care	and	to	choose	 𝑥, 𝑦 	in	which	case	the	equilibrium	price	is	𝜋.	Proof	of	proposition	4:	the	proof	of	b)	is	straightforward;	a)	deserves	some	explanation.	Indeed,	 as	 the	 game	 is	 one	 of	 complete	 information,	 firm	 𝑖	 knows	 that	 for	 firm	 𝑗,	𝐵 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑦l < 𝐵∗ 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗, 𝑦l∗ ,	and	that	firm	𝑗’s	interest	is	to	comply	with	the	SCL.	Then,	the	 range	 of	 equilibrium	 values	 for	 prevention	 is	 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥∗.	 Firm	 𝑖	will	 determine	 the	
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corresponding	equilibrium	prevention	level,	𝑥l ≥ 𝑥l∗.	It	follows	that	the	equilibrium	is	𝑞l, 𝑞 	 such	 that	 𝑞l, 𝑞 < 𝑞l, 𝑞 .	 Indeed,	 firm	 𝑖	 may	 benefit	 from	 firm	 𝑗’s	limitation	of	supply,	and	may	extend	its	production	to	𝑞l	with	𝑥l ≥ 𝑥l∗		(i.e.	respecting	the	SCL	condition).	We	can	then	deduce	the	equilibrium	price𝜋,		with	𝜋∗ ≥ 𝜋 > 𝜋.	█	From	the	above	proposition,	it	appears	that	by	enforcing	negligence	the	regulator	affects	the	market	equilibrium,	unlike	under	strict	liability	where	it	is	in	firm	𝑗’s	interest	is	to	comply	with	the	SCL.	Proposition	4.a	states	that	strict	liability	and	negligence	affect	different	 equilibrium	 market	 values.	 Without	 any	 reference	 to	 the	 SLC,	 under	 strict	liability	each	firm	supplies	the	level	that	maximizes	its	profits;	however,	under	negligence,	the	 more	 exposed	 firm	 (here	 𝑗)	 may	 be	 induced	 to	 reduce	 its	 supply	 which	 in	 turn,	influences	 firm	 𝑖	 which	may	 find	 it	 in	 its	 interest	 to	 increase	 its	market	 share	 at	 the	expense	of	safety.	However,	proposition	4.b	shows	that	enforcement	of	negligence	could	have	no	impact	on	the	exposed	firm	𝑗;	the	latter	may	prefer	not	to	comply	with	the	SCL.	Indeed,	 it	 prefers	 running	 the	 risk	 “as	 if”	 it	 was	 ruled	 by	 strict	 liability.	 In	 this	 case,	negligence	does	not	affect	the	market	equilibrium,	and	this	regime	does	not	reinforce	the	safety	level.		4. Conclusion	
This	 paper	 analyzed	 the	 effects	 of	 different	 liability	 regimes	 on	 the	 strategic	behavior	of	a	Cournot	duopoly	involved	in	risky	activities.	Firms	are	capacity-constrained	in	that	they	use	a	limited	input	for	both	production	and	care.	Introducing	liability	regimes	in	tort	law	induces	changes	in	the	firms’	behavior.	Originally,	the	unilateral	accident	model	showed	that	to	avoid	any	involvement,	firms	must	dedicate	resources	to	increase	their	investment	 in	 prevention.	 In	 that	 framework,	 a	 representative	 firm’s	 objective	 is	 to	maximize	its	care	level	and	minimize	its	“primary”	accident	costs	in	the	sense	of	Calabresi	(1970)	(the	direct	cost	of	an	accident	and	the	prevention	level).	Very	few	contributions	study	the	effect	of	competition	on	liabilities	except	in	the	case	of	product	liability.		We	use	strict	liability	as	the	benchmark	under	the	rationale	that	in	this	regime	the	firms’	 liability	 involvement	 is	 automatic	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 accident.	 Consequently,	 its	interest	 is	 to	minimize	 the	 accident	 probability	 by	 providing	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 care	
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necessary	to	maximize	its	profit.	Could	the	negligence	rule	lead	to	an	increased	level	of	care?	By	conforming	to	a	supposedly	known	social	care	level,	firms	may	hope	to	escape	to	their	duty	of	repair	in	the	case	of	an	accident.	However,	because	they	are	operating	under	complete	but	imperfect	information,	a	prisoner’s	dilemma	could	arise.	The	equilibrium	of	this	game	is	detrimental	to	the	market	from	the	regulator’s	perspective	because	firms	will	supply	more	output	at	the	expense	of	the	level	of	care.	In	this	respect,	negligence	may	not	be	a	sufficient	legal	device	to	induce	firms	to	take	due	care.	Then,	 enforcing	 liability	 regimes	 affects	 impacts	 on	 the	 level	 of	 exchange	 by	encouraging	or	deterring	firms’	supply.	This	affects	the	equilibrium	price.	If	firms	comply	with	the	social	care	level	under	the	negligence	rule,	then	they	will	supply	fewer	goods	and	services	than	under	strict	liability.	Indeed,	the	more	stringent	the	safety	standards,	the	higher	the	prices	and	the	lower	the	market	quantities.		This	paper	is	a	first	attempt	to	study	the	relationships	between	liability	regimes	and	 competition	beyond	 the	 issue	of	 product	 liability.	 Several	 directions	 remain	 to	be	explored	such	as	agents’	attitude	to	risk	and	uncertainty,	the	effect	of	different	liability	regimes	 when	 firms	 collude,	 and	 the	 oligopolistic	 dynamics	 when	 capacities	 are	endogenous.			 Appendix	A	Cournot-Nash	solution	under	strict	liability		 max	, 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦 + 𝑦) 𝑎	𝑦l − 𝑥l − 	𝑦l − 1 − 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎	𝑦l , 𝑖 = 1,2	 (A.1)	Under	the	constraints:		 𝑦l + 𝑥l ≤ 	𝑌l	 (A.2)		 𝑥l ≤ 1	 (A.3)		 𝑥l, 𝑦l ≥ 0	 (A.4)	Let	us	consider	the	Lagrangian	of	this	program	for	firm	1:	ℒ 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝜆, 𝜆 = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦 + 𝑦) 𝑎	𝑦 − 𝑥 − 	𝑦 − 1 − 𝑥 𝐷𝑎𝑦 + 𝜆 	𝑌 − 𝑦 − 𝑥 +𝜆 1 − 𝑥 ,	 	 (A.5)	The	Karush-Kuhn-Tucker	conditions	are:		 ºℒº ≤ 0 ⇒ −1 + 𝑎𝐷	𝑦 − 𝜆 − 𝜆 ≤ 0	 (A.6)		 ºℒº ≤ 0 ⇒ 𝑎𝐾 − 2	𝑎𝑦 − 𝑎𝑦 − 1 − 1 − 𝑥 𝐷𝑎	 − 𝜆 ≤ 0	 (A.7)	
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	 𝑥 ºℒº = 0 ⇒ 𝑥 −1 + 𝑎𝐷	𝑦 − 𝜆 − 𝜆 = 0	 (A.8)		 𝑦 ºℒº = 0 ⇒ 𝑦 𝑎𝐾 − 2	𝑎𝑦 − 𝑎𝑦 − 1 − 1 − 𝑥 𝐷𝑎	 − 𝜆 = 0	 (A.9)		 𝑥 ≥ 0	 (A.10)		 𝑦 ≥ 0	 (A.11)		 ºℒº» ≥ 0 ⇒ 	𝑌 − 𝑦 − 𝑥 ≥ 0	 (A.12)		 ºℒº» ≥ 0 ⇒ 1 − 𝑥 ≥ 0	 (A.13)		 𝜆 	 ºℒº» = 0 ⇒ 𝜆 	𝑌 − 𝑦 − 𝑥 = 0	 (A.14)		 𝜆 ºℒº» = 0 ⇒ 𝜆 1 − 𝑥 = 0	 (A.15)		 𝜆 ≥ 0	 (A.16)		 𝜆 ≥ 0.	 (A.17)		We	seek	an	interior	solution	for	𝑥 < 1	under	the	capacity	constraint;	thus,	suppose	that	𝜆 > 0	(⇒ 𝑦 = 	𝑌 − 𝑥	in	A.14)	and	A.13	is	not	binding	(⇒ 𝜆 = 0).	Therefore,	𝜆 =𝑎𝐷𝑦 − 1	in	A.8.	We	first	discard	(𝑥, 𝑥) = (0,0)	(𝑦 = 	𝑌,	𝑦 = 	𝑌)	because	A.9	would	be	 equal	 to	 𝑎𝑌 𝐾 − 	𝑎 2𝑌 + 𝑌 − 𝐷 − 𝐷𝑌 = 𝑎𝑌 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑌 + 𝑌) − 𝐷 − 𝑎 + 𝐷 𝑌 ,	which	is	negative	as	𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑌 + 𝑌) − 𝐷 < 0	by	assumption.	But	A.9	must	be	equal	to	zero.	Therefore	 (𝑥, 𝑥) = (0,0)	 is	 impossible.	Note	also	 that	𝑦,	 and	 therefore	𝑦,	 cannot	be	equal	to	zero,	otherwise	𝜆	would	be	negative	which	would	contradict	condition	A.16.	We	thus	solve	the	following	system:			 −1 + 𝑎𝐷	𝑦 − 𝜆 = 0.	 		 𝑎𝐾 − 2	𝑎𝑦 − 𝑎𝑦 − 1 − 1 − 𝑥 𝐷𝑎	 − 𝜆 = 0.	 		 	𝑌 − 𝑦 − 𝑥 = 0.	 	where	0 < 𝑥 < 1.	The	best	response	functions	for	𝑦	and	𝑥	are:			 𝑦 =  + (r)(r) 	and	𝑥 =  + ((r))(r) ,	and	for	𝑦	and	𝑥:			 𝑦 =  + (r)(r) ,	and	𝑥 =  + ((r))(r) .		 Appendix	B	
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Demonstration	of	the	inequality	between	the	internal	level	of	care	and	the	socially	first	best	care	level.		We	adopt	the	well-known	view	that	the	regulator	a	priori	calculates	the	value	for	the	socially	first	best	level	of	care	that	firms	should	choose.	Accordingly,	considering	the	unilateral	standard	accident	model,	the	regulator	looks	to	minimize	the	social	cost	of	an	accident	which	 comprises	 the	 prevention	 cost	𝑥	 and	 the	 expected	 cost	 of	 an	 accident	𝑝 𝑥 ℎ(𝑥),	where	ℎ(𝑥)	is	the	total	damage	which	here	depends	on	the	level	of	care.	Using	our	notations	and	replacing	𝑦l 	by	𝑌l − 𝑥l ,	the	social	cost	can	be	written	as		 𝑆𝐶 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑝 𝑥 𝐻 𝑥 = 𝑥l + 1 − 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎	(𝑌l − 𝑥l)	𝑖 = 1,2.	Then,	from	the	first	order	conditions	we	can	deduce	the	socially	first	best	of	care	𝑥l:			 𝑥l = 	 +  − 	 (B.1)	The	conditions	for	1 > 𝑥l∗ ≥ 0	are	satisfied.	Parameters	𝑎	and	𝐷	are	greater	than	1	by	assumption,	therefore	1/2 − 1/2𝑎𝐷 > 0	and	thus	𝑥l∗ > 0.	Moreover,		𝑌l < 1 + 1/𝑎𝐷	by	assumption,	so	𝑥l < 1.	We	can	show	that	this	optimal	level	𝑥l∗	is	greater	than	𝑥l 	for	firm	𝑖,	i.e.	𝑥l > 𝑥l ,	where	𝑥l =  + ((r))(r) 	(see	appendix	A).	Subtracting	𝑥l 	from	𝑥l∗	we	obtain		 𝑥l − 𝑥l =  −  − ((r))(r) .	Note	that	𝐷 − (𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑌l + 𝑦))<	𝐷 − 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑌l + 𝑌 ) < 𝐷,	∀	𝑖, 𝑗,	since	𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑌l + 𝑌) >0	by	assumption.	Therefore,		 𝑥l − 𝑥l >  −  −  r .	Reducing	 the	 right-hand	 side	of	 this	 inequality	 to	 a	 common	denominator	 then	factoring	out	½	we	obtain		  −  −  r =   r .	But	𝑎	and	𝐷	are	both	greater	than	1	with	𝑎	sufficiently	large	relative	to	1/𝐷	(𝑎 >1 + 1/𝐷	by	 assumption);	 thus,	 𝑎𝐷 > 𝑎𝐷 + 𝑎.	 Therefore,	 𝑎𝐷 − 𝑎 − 𝐷 > 𝑎𝐷 + 𝑎 − 𝑎 −𝐷 = 𝐷 𝑎 − 1 > 0,	and	consequently,	𝑥l − 𝑥l > 0.		 Appendix	C	Proof	of	proposition	1	
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Part	1.a.i:	to	avoid	any	liability,	firms	𝑖	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑗	both	decide	to	comply	with	the	SCL	and	 enforce	 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗ ,	 where	 𝑥l∗ > 𝑥l	 and	 𝑦l > 𝑦l∗.	 Consequently,	 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗; 𝑦∗ >𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 	 where	 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l; 𝑦 = 𝐾 − 𝑎(𝑦l + 𝑦) 𝑎𝑦l − 𝑥l − 𝑦l −	𝑝 𝑥l 𝐷𝑎𝑦l	is	net	of	the	accident	cost;	with	compliance	firms	avoid	this	cost.	Part	1.a.ii:	 as	 the	 equilibrium	quantities	 are	𝑞l∗ = 𝑎𝑦l∗ < 𝑞l	 	𝑖 = 1,2 	 then	𝑞∗ +𝑞∗ < 𝑞 + 𝑞	(from	the	definition	of	the	inverse	demand	function).	It	follows	that	𝜋∗ >	𝜋.	Equilibrium	 𝑞l∗, 𝑞∗ 	is	a	Nash	equilibrium	and	there	is	no	prisoner’s	dilemma.	Part	 1.b.i:	 𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l, 𝑦 < 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗, 𝑦∗ 	 but	 𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª, 𝑦∗ > 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗, 𝑦∗ 	.	Firms	do	not	communicate.	Neither	has	an	interest	in	complying	with	the	SCL.	Since	each	firm	ignores	what	its	rival	will	do,	it	chooses	not	to	comply	and	to	supply	𝜑 𝑦lª , 𝑖 = 1,2.	Consequently,	total	output	is	𝜑 𝑦ª + 𝜑 𝑦ª = 𝑞ª + 𝑞ª.However,		since	𝑞lª > 𝑞l∗, 𝑖 = 1,2,	firms	risk	being	liable;	thus	𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª, 𝑦ª < 𝐵∗ 𝑥l∗, 𝑦l∗, 𝑦∗ ,	𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗).	It	is	optimal	to	deviate	from	the	SCL	only	if	both	firms	choose	the	strict	liability	solution	 𝑞lª, 𝑞ª, 𝑃ª	 	which	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 putting	 in	 place	 𝑥l, 𝑦l , 𝑖 = 1,2.	 Other	 solutions	 are	dominated,	then	𝐵 𝑥l, 𝑦l, 𝑦 > 𝐵ª 𝑥lª, 𝑦lª, 𝑦ª .	Part	1.b.ii:	in	the	case	𝜋ª < 𝜋∗,	the	inequality	is	immediate,	given	𝑞lª > 𝑞l∗,	𝑖 = 1,2.	If	𝜋ª	is	higher	or	lower	than	𝜋,	then	if	𝑞lª > 𝑞l,	𝑖 = 1,2,	𝜋ª < 𝜋;	otherwise	𝜋ª ≥ 𝜋.	 	
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